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Urban Forced Removals in
Rio de Janeiro and Los Angeles:
North-South Similarities in Race and City
Constance G. Anthony1
In April of 2010, Rio de Janeiro’s mayor, Eduardo Paes,
announced that two in-city, poor, and largely Afro-Brazilian
neighborhoods, Morro dos Prazeres and Laboriaux, would be
cleared and all inhabitants would be forced to move.2 Despite devastating winter storms, which had indicated again the precariousness of Rio’s hillside favelas, this was not really new news.3 Rio’s
favelas have experienced a century of forced removal.4 The early
neighborhoods were built in historically undesirable, beautiful,
but steeply inaccessible parts of Rio, and today these are important pieces of Rio’s real estate.5 For more than a century, many
such favelas have allowed poor, working class Afro-Brazilians
immediate access to the city below.6 While there are incredible
challenges with living in neighborhoods cut off from good, or in
some cases even basic, city services and infrastructure, the
resources of the city at large continued to make these neighborhoods highly desirable for those who lived, and as importantly,
worked there.7
Cities across the globe use this mandate for the forced movement of poor populations out of in-city urban neighborhoods.8
1. Constance G. Anthony is Associate Professor in the Department of Political
Science at Seattle University. She received her PhD at the University of California,
Berkeley. She has published a book on the politics of international aid and technology
transfer with Columbia University Press, and articles on US science policy, refugees,
and famine in Africa as well as the philosophical foundations of US interventionism.
She is currently applying a comparative development analysis for understanding the
African resource curse and for assessing the continuation of a distinctive Third World
normative stance on justice in the global economy.
2. Tom Phillips, Rio Slum Dwellers Face Forced Eviction After Landslides,
GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 2010, at 26, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/
apr/11/rio-brazil-slum-forced-evictions.
3. Id.
4. BRODWYN FISCHER, A POVERTY OF RIGHTS: CITIZENSHIP AND INEQUALITY IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY RIO DE JANEIRO 26 (Stanford Univ. Press 2008).
5. Id. at 26-27.
6. Id. at 31-32.
7. Id. at 31-32.
8. Destroying Makoko; Nigeria’s Commercial Capital, ECONOMIST, Aug. 18, 2012,
at 46, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21560615.
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There is often a precipitating crisis like the spring storms in Rio
but just as often there have been repeated earlier intrusions.9
Because of the poverty, collapse of infrastructure, unmaintained
homes, public sanitation, or other indicators of urban blight, the
neighborhood from which a given population is removed has usually been assessed and studied prior to a mandate to exit. The
interest of city government in the public policy goal of improving
social welfare and the quality of urban life leads to a call, like that
of Paes, for neighborhood residents to leave.10 The most disturbing
aspect of this type of urban redevelopment is that residents are
threatened with severe consequences if they do not leave voluntarily and are forcibly removed if they choose to stay.11 Seemingly, it
is the character of the crisis and/or the extent of neglect that make
other public policy options so unattractive to public policy makers.
Forced removal occurred most dramatically for many years in
South Africa, prior to the end of apartheid and the introduction of
a society-wide democratic franchise.12 Cities in South Africa stand
as the starkest example of an urban vision that places poor, nonwhite populations on the geographic perimeter of the urban landscape, far from the resources and opportunities of urban life.13 The
neighborhoods targeted were distinct in respect to class, culture,
and race from the vision of those who governed the city and the
nation.14 When forced removal is a fundamental part of the urban
development of a city, the vision of exclusion is generally articu9. See ROBERT GAY, POPULAR ORGANIZATION AND DEMOCRACY IN RIO DE JANEIRO
15, 19-20 (Temple Univ. Press 1994); Simon Romero, Slum Dwellers Are Defying
Brazil’s Grand Design for Olympics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/05/world/americas/brazil-faces-obstacles-inpreparations-for-rio-olympics.html?pagewanted=all.
10. Phillips, supra note 2, at 26; see generally Claudia B. Haake, Breaking the
Bonds of People and Land, in REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN THE MODERN
WORLD 79, 79 (Richard Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009).
11. Phillips, supra note 2, at 26; Destroying Makoko, supra note 8, at 46; Romero,
supra note 9, at A1.
12. See AROUND THE WORLD; Report Says Pretoria Relocated 3.5 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 9, 1984, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/02/09/world/aroundthe-world-report-says-pretoria-relocated-3.5-million.html; see generally Francis X.
Clines, Reagan Attacks Soviet Union and South Africa on Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1984, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/11/world/reagan-attackssoviet-and-south-africa-on-rights.html.
13. Jane Perlez, Khorixas Journal; For Apartheid’s Castaways, Heartbreak in
Desert, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 7, 1989, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/07/
world/khorixas-journal-for-apartheid-s-castaways-heartbreak-in-desert.html; Alan
Cowell, South Africa Orders the Removal of 10,000 Blacks to New Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 18, 1986, § 1, at 13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/10/18/world/southafrica-orders-the-removal-of-10000-blacks-to-new-site.html.
14. Perlez, supra note 13.
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lated early in the life of the city, when democratic practices are
not yet in place.15 The effort to remove these population groups is
the kind of social engineering approach to urban renewal that
mirrors an authoritarian state’s more general approach to development.16 This kind of state need not be attentive to elections or
the need for legitimacy with a larger constituency.17 As a consequence, the state privileges some population groups over others in
the urban, political imagination. Mandated, forced removal is a
form of urban redevelopment that maintains or literally redraws
the class and race boundaries of the city to reflect that of imagined
polis.18
The politics of forced removal is not problematic for empires,
totalitarian states, or for authoritarian governments with little
interest in democratization.19 Such states do not offer the kind of
political or civil liberties that protect citizens from the arbitrary
actions of the state.20 For democratically elected governments, or
for states with a view to making a democratic transition, violating
rule of law or universally recognized human rights is costly.21
These type of states need to be attentive to national or international legitimacy whatever the immediate material gains. It is
striking that in semi-democratic states, in which democratic institutions represent and protect the rights of a portion of the population or in which democratic processes are unevenly developed,
urban forced removal is still undertaken to maintain the privileges of class and race.22 What this analysis of Rio de Janeiro will
suggest is that the expansion of democratic processes and rights
does not always result in the redefinition of the local political
economy of race. Without a revising of urban, democratic citizenship, clearing neighborhoods of unwanted population groups continues to be an attractive form of local and national politics.23
15. GAY, supra note 9, at 15.
16. Andrea Smith, Coerced or Free? Considering Post-Colonial Returns, in
REMOVING PEOPLES: FORCED REMOVAL IN THE MODERN WORLD 395, 395 (Richard
Bessel & Claudia B. Haake eds., 2009).
17. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 83 (11th ed. 2003) (definition of
authoritarian).
18. Perlez, supra note 13.
19. Smith, supra note 16, at 395.
20. THEODORE M. VESTAL, ETHIOPIA: A POST-COLD WAR AFRICAN STATE 16-17
(1999); see also STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAS A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM 8
(2010).
21. VESTAL, supra note 20, at 16-17; LEVITSKY & WAY, supra note 20, at 17-18.
22. Perlez, supra note 13.
23. Romero, supra note 9, at A1.
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In her most recent book on Brazilian favelas, Janice Perlman
maintains that
every ‘first-world’ city has with it a ‘third world’ city of high
infant mortality, malnutrition, unemployment, homelessness, and contagious diseases; and every third-world city
has within it a first-world city of high finance, high technology, high fashion, and high culture.24
While this statement might be considered commonplace, it is rare
to see direct north-south comparisons of social, political, or economic development.25 In order to emphasize the persistence of traditions of forced removal during transitions from authoritarian
state building into democratic polities, this discussion will include
a consideration of aspects of forced removal in Los Angeles. The
Los Angeles pattern of population removal that will be examined
here concerns the removal of Mexican and Mexican-American
(Chicano) populations. It is a sporadic but consistent policy beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with the arrival of American
settlement and continuing today.26 It is important to take note
that the politics of forced removal in Los Angeles took place
entirely within the confines of a democratic political form, in a
region of the country that was not a part of the regional tradition
of explicit and legislated racial exclusion.27

I. FOUNDATIONAL URBAN VISION
The city leaders and elites in Rio at the turn of the last century, and for many decades after that, embraced the twin themes
of civilization and modernization.28 This was not unique to Rio but
an approach to the articulation of an urban vision that was shared
in many parts of Latin America.29 In Rio de Janeiro, one striking,
or special, piece of this was how the elite’s commitment to Europe24. JANICE PERLMAN, FAVELA: FOUR DECADES OF LIVING ON THE EDGE IN RIO DE
JANEIRO 9 (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
25. Janet Abu-Lughod, Disappearing Dichotomies: First World-Third World;
Traditional-Modern, 3.2 TRADITIONAL DWELLINGS & SETTLEMENT REV. 7, 8 (1992).
26. Steven W. Bender, Knocked Down Again: An East L.A. Story on the Geography
of Color and Colors, 12 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 109, 112 (2009).
27. Id. at 113-14.
28. Thomas E. Skidmore, Racial Ideas and Social Policy in Brazil, 1870-1940, in
THE IDEA OF RACE IN LATIN AMERICA, 1870-1940, (Aline Helg et al. eds., 1990) 7;
TERESA A. MEADE, ‘CIVILIZING’ RIO: REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN A BRAZILIAN CITY,
1889-1930 5 (Penn. State Univ. Press 1997).
29. Lisa M. Edwards, Paths to Progress in Modern Latin America, 7.3 WORLD
HIST. CONNECTED (2010), available at http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/
7.3/edwards.html; MEADE, supra note 28 at 28-29.
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anization of the city was given support by pushing poor, AfroBrazilians into favelas.30 Rio in the nineteenth century, like Bahia
in the twentieth century, had been a primarily African city.31 The
strong identification with modernization, the attachment of this
attribute to the idea of European civilization, and finally, the
effort to marginalize Afro-Brazilian roots and peoples would set
the foundational urban vision for the city for much of the twentieth century.32 Despite this, in respect to urban neighborhoods,
there was a cultural dialectic between the Rio that looked towards
Europe and that which incorporated African, Afro-European and
Afro-Indigenous peoples.33 While in cultural terms this was a creative and rich dialectic, in respect to political economy, it disenfranchised the children of Africa.34
The initial steps to reform Rio were taken by Brazil’s president, Rodrigues Alves, after it became clear that the character of
the city was impeding the access to foreign capital.35 It was also
done to build on the popular notice that Rio was beginning to
receive in England, France, and Germany.36 Beautification and
modernization, or becoming civilized, included addressing public
health, tenement housing, and dilapidated infrastructure.37 Aesthetically, Paris was the model for Rio’s new mayor, Pereira Passos, who initiated comprehensive urban redevelopment.38 To
address infectious diseases like yellow fever that plagued the city,
unsanitary tenements were destroyed. At the turn of the century,
the city had a reputation as a “pesthole.”39 Yellow fever and small
pox threatened the health of wealthy as well as the poor households, and because of “fear of contagion, some ship captains
stopped calling at the port.”40 The most direct route to improved
sanitation was seen to be the destruction of low rent housing in
30. Ney dos Santos Oliveira, Favelas and Ghettos: Race and Class in Rio de
Janeiro and New York City, 23 LATIN AM. PERSPECTIVES 71, 75 (1996).
31. Id. at 74.
32. MEADE, supra note 28, at 19.
33. Id. at 29-31.
34. Id. at 32.
35. Christopher G. Boone, Streetcars and Politics in Rio de Janeiro: Private
Enterprise versus Municipal Government in the Provision of Mass Transit, 1903-1920,
27 J. LATIN AM. STUD. 343, 347 (1995).
36. MEADE, supra note 28, at 33.
37. Id. at 4; Boone, supra note 35, at 343.
38. MEADE, supra note 28, at 4; Boone, supra note 35, at 348.
39. Jeffrey D. Needell, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires: Public Space and Public
Consciousness in Fin-De Siecle Latin America, 40 COMP. STUD. SOC’Y & HIST. 519, 530
(1995).
40. Boone, supra note 35, at 346.
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the city center and a complete redesign of public buildings and
main boulevards.41 About 14,000 people were displaced as buildings were condemned as unlivable, another 3,842 lost their homes
as the new commercial center was created, and demolition
claimed many more structures.42 This process of getting rid of
existing housing in order to set the foundation for Rio’s rebirth
“far outpaced the construction of replacement units.”43 One direct
public health effort, mandatory vaccination, triggered extensive
and popular riots in 1904, which was probably more about economic misery than vaccination.44
The urban vision of Rio as a European city was linked to the
city’s interest in greater investment but also greater immigration
and focus on the European roots of the city.45 The ending of slavery
in 1888 resulted in extensive migration of former slaves into Rio.46
It was not because of any vigorous economic pull, but rather
because of the push of rural poverty and underemployment.47 The
perception by many who came was that “people can earn money
and the living is good.”48 In 1890, the Brazilian national government banned Asian and black immigration.49 Despite this, the inmigration from Bahia continued to add ex-slaves and libertos to
Rio’s Afro-Brazilian neighborhoods well into the twentieth century.50 Local elites obsessed “with transcending what they perceived as laziness and colonial backwardness, mixed with racial
and class tension.”51 This concern reflected national as well as
local biases.52 The foreign minister in the Alves administration
formed his diplomatic service by picking men “for their European,
aristocratic appearance, style, and cultivation.”53 Even sympa41. Id. at 348.
42. Id. at 348-50.
43. Id. at 347.
44. MEADE, supra note 28, at 1-3.
45. Id. at 31.
46. Kit McPhee, “Immigrants with Money Are No Use To Us” Race and Ethnicity
in the Zona Portuária of Rio de Janeiro, 1903-1912, 62 THE AMERICAS 623, 636 (2006).
47. MEADE, supra note 28, at 19.
48. McPhee, supra note 46, at 636.
49. MEADE, supra note 28, at 31.
50. Patricia Acerbi, Slave Legacies, Ambivalent Modernity: Street Commerce and
the Transition to Free Labor in Rio de Janeiro, 1850-1925, at 252 (2010) (Abstract of
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Maryland) (On file with Digital Repository at
the University of Maryland).
51. See generally Boone, supra note 35, at 347; Jeffrey D. Needell, The Domestic
Civilizing Mission: The Cultural Role of the State in Brazil, 1808-1930, 36 LUSOBRAZILLIAN REV. 1, 7 (1999).
52. Needell, supra note 51, at 7.
53. Id. at 6.
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thetic Brazilian chroniclers of the poor neighborhoods of Rio at the
turn of the century like Joao do Rio, while impressed with their
culture and the romance of the streets, could not see these populations as equal to that of European Rio.54 The planner who wrote
the urban plan of 1930 called the favelas “plagues.”55
Early in the twentieth century the Portuguese migration
allowed the city to stride past its African and indigenous history.56
The impact of the “whitening” of the Brazilian population through
greater European immigration meant that there was now in Rio
“a serious oversupply of labor in occupations long monopolized by
the Afro-Brazilian population.”57 By 1920, 20.7% of Rio’s population and 37% of employed males were first generation immigrants.58 This included blue-collar jobs, manual labor, part time or
temporary employment, and small business.59 There was fierce
competition in the case of the latter and resentment across lines of
race and community as a consequence.60 For some analysts, the
support given to immigration, along with protective tariffs for new
industry, are the strongest indications that the State was taking a
lead in making economic development happen.61 In its recruitment
of European immigrants, “there emerged not only a semi-skilled
working class but also numerous pioneering entrepreneurs.”62 The
unwillingness of the Brazilian state in the nineteenth century to
protect its own market was more attentive to laissez faire than
even the United States, which moved to lessen its dependence on
Europe.63 This can also be seen as the kind of Europeanized comprador class much of the dependence literature has identified as a
major impediment to national development.64
Favelas were almost immediately part of the urban redevelopment of the early twentieth century.65 Displaced residents were
pushed into them, and they increasingly became the neighbor54. See generally Boone, supra note 35, at 343.
55. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 43.
56. Rosana Barbosa Nunes, Portuguese Migration to Rio de Janeiro, 1822-1850, 57
AMS. 37, 37-61 (2000).
57. McPhee, supra note 46, at 643.
58. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 31.
59. McPhee, supra note 46, at 644-45.
60. Id. at 644.
61. ATUL KOHLI, STATE-DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY. 139 (2004).
62. Id. at 128.
63. Id. at 134.
64. Id. at 134-35.
65. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 33-36.
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hoods of city neglect and underemployment.66 The first favela is
often identified as Morro de Providencia, founded in 1897 on a hill
close to the city center.67 This movement of the poor classes into
the high hills continued for decades, reversing the earliest settlement pattern of the city in which the city’s hills were settled by
the rich, and the diseased, swampy low lands by the poor.68 In fact,
some historical sources maintain that the first favela was created
here.69 The neighborhood of Valongo, like the majority of favelas
today, was on the outskirts of the most urban part of the city.70
This neighborhood in a swampy, inhospitable area was set aside
for slaves in transit in order to hide “the atrocities of the slave
trade” and offer less offense to the sensibilities of the 1770s European elite.71 Because the slaves of this neighborhood were “not
always passive or submissive,” whites feared them and the neighborhood.72 In this way, Valongo is a historical foreshadowing of the
insider-outsider pattern of settlement of the city to come.73
Morro de Providencia was established by soldiers who had
helped the state defeat a rural commune movement that was supported by the landless, former slaves and the indigenous.74
Despairing after not receiving the public housing that had been
promised, they settled a hill near the downtown area, and because
“a rotting overcrowded tenement. . .was razed. . .1,000 displaced
persons came to join the veterans.”75 The destruction of inner city
tenements occurred, in some cases, in front of local economic and
political elites while residents pleaded “fruitlessly for the chance
to remove their belongings.”76 Thirty-seven thousand people lost
their homes in these early forced removals.77 Some sources assert
that it was the media’s early portrayal of this first favela settlement as a place of chaos and danger that established the favela as
not part of the real Rio.78 However, as Rio’s economy grew, a seri66. Id. at 33.
67. Greg O’Hare & Michael Barke, The Favelas of Rio de Janeiro: A Temporal and
Spatial Analysis, 56 GEOJOURNAL. 225, 232 (2002).
68. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 26.
69. David Underwood, ‘Civilizing’ Rio de Janeiro: Four Centuries of Conquest
through Architecture, 51 ART J. 48, 51 (1992).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 56.
73. Id.
74. O’Hare & Barke, supra note 67, at 232.
75. PERLMAN, supra note 24, at 25.
76. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 43.
77. Id.
78. Nicole Maria Turcheti e Melo, Public Policy for the Favelas in Rio de Janeiro 7
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ous housing crisis drove the expansion of such informal settlements.79 Because the use of wood was outlawed for construction
within the city, public policy itself drove the poor into the surrounding hills to build homes.80
If there was any doubt about the city’s vision for itself, the
growth of favelas on the hillsides of Rio and then into the Zona
Norte concretized the reality of a dual political economy based
upon a racial and cultural divide.81 As the city modernized and
grasped the carousel ring of civilization and international investment, the favelas were the place where the European population
hid its own deeply African and indigenous history. The policies of
forced removal, which cleared out the city center at the turn of the
century in order to create the new Paris in the tropics, would
return to continue the job in the surrounding favelas.82 Favelas
became the scar that needed to be erased from the city’s new face
of civilization and modernity.83

II. REORGANIZATION IN AN AUTHORITARIAN
DEMOCRATIC CITY

AND

SEMI-

Following turn-of-the century reforms and the creation of a
modern Rio, was a period of democracy for the few, followed by
military government.84 Massive rural migration into the city continued, the consequent housing crisis was aggravated, and favelas
grew.85 This led to more forced removal at the same time that the
new political context led community organizations and favela
leaders to attempt to establish communication and patron-client
linkages with local political and civic actors. During the years of
President Getúlio Vargas, the idea of caring for the impoverished
was given considerable public support. Despite this, in the twenties and thirties official Rio tried to push its poorest residents out
of poor, close, in-city neighborhoods with new laws, building codes,
public evictions, use of military and police force, and unexplained
night violence and fires.86 In 1937, a building code was passed
(November, 2010) (unpublished research paper for M.A., International Institute of
Social Studies) (on file with the Institute of Social Studies).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. PERLMAN, supra note 24, at 201.
85. Id. at 26.
86. Id.
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which strictly forbid the building of new favelas and from improving any aspect of established buildings.87 The view was that favelas were a problem for the city in every way, and in the 1940s, Rio
first experienced the wholesale razing of favelas.88 In theory these
residents were to occupy new public housing. An early experiment in public housing was the Parques Proletarios.89 Four such
communities were built in the early forties and ultimately housed
7,500 people.90 The best units, however, went to public employees
and those with influence.91 There were entry gates, ID cards, and
an evening loud speaker that broadcast lectures on moral behavior.92 Thus, while seemingly an attempt to meet the housing needs
of the poor, they included significant patronage and were
“designed not only to accommodate but also to isolate and
control.”93
The Parques Proletarios did not result in a more vibrant community, less poverty, and did not solve the low-income housing crisis in Rio,94 despite the fact that in 1947 the Commission for the
Eradication of the Favelas was established.95 The failure of this
effort to solve the problems of poverty, underemployment, and
housing for favela residents raised the consciousness of many in
Rio who had seen the favelas as primarily a problem of policing.96
In 1945, Vargas was removed and there followed almost two
decades of democratic politics.97 With democracy came more attention to social welfare and the deceleration of favela eradication.98
The development of a new politics of clientelism followed the creation of public agencies to improve conditions in favelas and to create more public housing.99 The Church also became explicitly
involved in providing resources and advocating for greater attention to the needs of favela populations.100 Despite this, city government did not really operate in the public interest overall because
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
FISCHER, supra note 4.
GAY, supra note 9, at 16.
FISCHER, supra note 4.
Id.
GAY, supra note 9, at 16.
Id.
Id.
JANICE PERLMAN, THE MYTH OF MARGINALITY: URBAN POVERTY AND POLITICS IN
RIO DE JANEIRO 200 (Univ. of California 1976).
96. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 75.
97. GAY, supra note 9, at 16.
98. Id. at 16-17.
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id. at 17.
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individual office holders “exploited the lack of basic urban services
in favelas and the ever present threat of removal as a cheap source
of votes.”101 In Rocinha, the establishment of such patron-client
relationships followed the paving of a main road in 1938.102 New
soccer fields, clinics, water and power lines, asfalto, and schools
were built in some neighborhoods, but property rights were withheld and sporadic evictions continued. The view that favela
residents were “stone age” people and “backward by virtue of
heredity” was not just a private view held by the few but publically presented in city studies and reports.103
The arrival of military government in 1964 ran parallel with
Rio’s new policy direction, which returned to favela eradication.
Initiated by Lacerda’s new state administration, “government policies took a radical approach by viewing favelas as a malaise that
should be removed from cities.”104 Thus, new public policy took Rio
back to extensive forced removal.105 It was a more complex experience and a more cynical policy because it was now in a context in
which the number of favelas, the level of income, the settled and
working class character of favela society, the community organization, and the leadership made favelas important partners in city
politics. Between 1960 and 1970, the population living in favelas
increased to 500,000 people. There were 162 officially recognized
communities and now 13% of Rio’s population lived in favelas.106
Even with the housing crisis, poverty, and lack of services there
was little radical politics in favelas and people “identified very
strongly” with the middle class.107 Despite this, or perhaps because
of it, slum clearance took on added momentum.108 The rise in
property values drove a city already famous for forced removal to
increase the intensity of this policy.109 Of the favelas that were
destroyed, the majority were “occupying attractive sites near
101. Id. at 18.
102. Daniela Fabricius, Resisting Representation: The Informal Geographies of Rio
de Janiero, 28 HARV. DESIGN MAG. (2008).
103. FISCHER, supra note 4, at 77.
104. CRISTIANE ROSE DUARTE & FERNANDA MAGALHÃES, CONTEMPORARY URBANISM
IN BRAZIL: BEYOND BRASILIA 266, 268 (Vicente del Rio & William Siembieda eds.,
Univ. Press of Fla. 2009).
105. Id.
106. Helia Nacif Xavier & Fernanda Magalhaes, Case Study of Rio de Janeiro, in
THE CHALLENGE OF SLUMS: GLOBAL REPORT ON HUMAN SETTLEMENTS 3 (2003).
107. PERLMAN, supra note 95, at 195.
108. Id.
109. MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 99 (Verso 2006); Xavier & Magalhaes, supra
note 106, at 16.
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coastline and in middle class neighborhoods.”110 During the 1960s
“some of the largest and most brutal favela razings in Rio’s history” were undertaken.111 Citing dangers of Marxist guerrillas, the
military government supported compulsory removal “with the aid
of the public security forces.”112 In 1968 the state and city government made a commitment to creating institutions that would rid
the city of favelas by 1976.113 This included the National Housing
Bank created in 1964, CHISAM, and SERFHA. Between 1965 and
1974, 134,000 people were removed from eighty favela residences.114 By 1973, sixty-two favelas or sections of favelas had
been eradicated and 175,785 people had been removed primarily
to the Zona Norte, located on the margins of the city and far away
from jobs and city amenities. The large-scale public housing in the
north that was created was similar to the Parque Prolitarios but
even less attentive to the needs of its residents for community and
urban amenities.
As resistance was organized to this government policy, police
were marshaled to make sure residents followed the city’s dictates
when they were ordered to leave. Initially, if people resisted, random shooting into crowds or selective beating occurred. According
to Robert Gay, “popular resistance to the removal process was
quickly and often brutally repressed.”115 When neighborhood
associations banded together to stop the arrival of trucks and city
officials, the city arrested and threatened the leadership until the
organizations were disbanded.116 Some people did not resist. As
one older woman in Catacumba explained: “If we try to defend
ourselves they will say we are Communists . . . . I know . . . that
they will kill me and my children if they think we are that.”117 The
financial costs for poor families in Rio were considerable. Most
removals left people at a greater distance from the city and jobs.
Thus, the costs included that of transportation, loss of jobs, loss of
investment in the home, and if they went to public housing,
rent.118 There was also loss of community and an increase in crime
due to anomie. Janice Perlman’s study of urban poverty in Rio de
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

DUARTE & MAGALHÃES, supra note 104.
FISCHER, supra note 4.
DAVIS, supra note 109, at 108.
PERLMAN, supra note 95, at 202.
DAVIS, supra note 109, at 102, 108.
GAY, supra note 9, at 20.
PERLMAN, supra note 95, at 206.
PERLMAN, supra note 24, at 78.
PERLMAN, supra note 95, at 214-15, 223-33.

\\jciprod01\productn\I\IAL\44-2\IAL207.txt

2013]

unknown

Seq: 13

1-NOV-13

URBAN FORCED REMOVALS

13:43

349

Janeiro in the 1970s found that the government policies of
removal created exactly the kind of social marginality they were
attempting to prevent. During that decade, the failure of forced
removal began to be acknowledged. This paralleled the growth of
a social movement that was the foundation for favela community
organizations in the 1980s that worked to reestablish patron-client relationships with local political institutions. It was this community-based politics that effectively prevented forced removal in
the late 1970s in favelas like Vidigal, and was the foundation for
the new favela politics of the democratic state.119

III. URBAN RENEWAL

WITH

DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS

In 1985 Tancredo Neves became the first elected, non-military president in 21 years. This began a new era of democratization in Brazil ushered in by many years of popular protest and the
formation of social movements. Rio saw large-scale protests in the
late seventies and early eighties calling for democratic rights and
the ending of military government.120 But in the twenty-first century, Rio’s favela population is less interested in its democratic
rights and more interested in security and dignity.121 Donna M.
Goldstein has found that Rio’s poor have a survival strategy of
laughing in the face of death. It can be misunderstood as insensitivity, but it grows from the extensiveness of violence and material insecurity.122
The fate of the favela in the most recent democratic era in
Brazil remains one of a deeply schizophrenic character.123 At the
same time, it is perceived as the iconic informal settlement, a
problematic cite of crime, disorder, poverty, and violence and “the
core of the carioca culture,” a font of samba, soccer, and other
deeply important parts of Rio de Janeiro’s identity.124 Favelas continue to grow in response to the rural to urban migration that
drives the growth of many Third World cities. While rural poverty
and illiteracy are in decline in Brazil, national wealth is still
highly inequitable. The opportunities that Rio presents for
employment still outstrip those in any rural region. Thus, Rio de
119. GAY, supra note 9, at 61.
120. Id. at 7.
121. See generally Joanna S. Wheeler, New Forms of Citizenship: Democracy,
Family and Community in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 11 GENDER & DEV. 36 (2003).
122. DONNA M. GOLDSTEIN, LAUGHTER OUT OF PLACE: RACE, CLASS, VIOLENCE, AND
SEXUALITY IN A RIO SHANTYTOWN 120-22 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2003).
123. Turcheti e Melo, supra note 78, at 1.
124. Id.
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Janeiro now has 518,752 or more favelas residents depending on
how they are defined.125 Some sources consider only what favelas
lack, such as legal property ownership, but others include social
and cultural factors. Numbers are disputed and cited in different
ways, but Rio probably has more than six hundred favelas. Favelas are illegal but, unlike many shantytowns or illegal urban settlements, most favelas are permanent with longstanding
businesses, some services, and residences solidly built.
Drug trafficking and violence began to be significant in the
mid-1980s, almost simultaneous with the end of military government and the return to democracy.126 The change in type of
regime, however, did not result in the immediate availability of
the kinds of economic resources that were so needed, and at the
same time, “the majority of favelas are also unpoliced.”127 Drug
gangs were able to grow in power within favelas for these two reasons.128 They walked into a political vacuum created by the longterm neglect of the city, taking over or exerting significant influence “over the dwellers associations, promoting the election of candidates that are engaged with their interests and expelling or
even killing the ones that are not willing to cooperate.”129 Some
gangs mediate family disputes, prevent or avenge sexual assault,
and work for the safety of residents.130 Gang leaders make a huge
difference in whether a neighborhood is relatively safe and stable
or unpredictably violent.131 Cooperation between drug gangs and
the police can actually victimize favela communities. Or in some
cases the traficantes from one favela attack those in another as a
consequence of drug gang turf wars such as the attack from a
Vidigal based gang in Rocinha in 2004. As one resident remarked
after recounting a day’s violence, “before the war, Rocinha was the
favela where everyone wanted to live.”132 In 2008, “military police
entered favelas with tanks and automatic weapons, occupying
them for weeks and effectively turning daily life into war.”133
125. Id.at 4.
126. GAY, supra note 9, at 12.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Turcheti e Melo, supra note 78, at 9.
130. Enrique Desmond Arias & Corinne Davis Rodrigues, The Myth of Personal
Security: Criminal Gangs, Dispute Resolution, and Identity in Rio de Janeiro’s
Favelas, 48 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y 53 (2006).
131. DONNA M. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 122, at 176-77.
132. PATRICK NEAT & DAMIAN PLATT, CULTURE IS OUR WEAPON: MAKING MUSIC AND
CHANGING LIVES IN RIO DE JANERIO 6 (Penguin Books 2006).
133. Fabricius, supra note 102.
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Rio is both a rich and a very poor city. In 2000, the richest one
percent of Rio’s population earned twelve percent of overall
income; the poorest fifty percent, thirteen percent of overall
income. Twenty percent of the poor are either unemployed or
underemployed.134 The jobs many of the poor hold include those
which meet the expectations of the middle and upper classes in
Rio, who fully expect to have domestic help for household tasks,
including the daily preparation of food. Goldstein sees this as an
ingrained state of mind and a kind of “cultivated incompetence”
which is a direct extension of slavery.135 But despite this almost
familial link between the working and wealthy classes, local
authorities again began calling for more favela removal in 2004
and 2005, prior to several destructive storms. Especially endangered were those on the hills close to the city, which also have the
longest history, and, in many cases, the most well established
communities. While in theory, forced removal is no longer an
active public policy, the policy legacy is actively referenced when
land speculation gets hot. In 2005, the city’s Public Prosecutor’s
office wanted to see fourteen favelas removed, all of which were
proximate to middle class neighborhoods.136 The environment is
given as a pretext. As Mike Davis points out, when there is vulnerable land in wealthy neighborhoods, there is public infrastructure and investment to protect it.137 For example, in the case of
steep, fragile soil there are geo-textile nets, rock bolts, terracing,
regarding, gunnite, and other measures that might be taken.138
Instead, in Rio, the kind of big bucks public investment that is
made in favelas is undertaken to ensure the residents and structures in favela neighborhoods remain as invisible as possible to
the larger city.139 In 2009, Mayor Paes began a program to build
concrete walls around the favelas that, as the mayor explained,
were important to the protection of the natural environment in
the city.140 The walls are called “ecolimits,” and despite a formal
UN critique, the state will spend about $24 million on the program.141 Many local residents see this as part of a plan to block
favelas from the view of those visiting for the 2016 Summer Olym134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Xavier & Magalhaes, supra note 106, at 15.
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 122, at 66-68.
NEAT & PLATT, supra note 132, at 80.
DAVIS, supra note 109, at 114.
See generally id. at 124.
PERLMAN, supra note 24, at 28.
Turcheti e Melo, supra note 78, at 23-24.
Id. at 22.
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pics.142 Rio is one of the Brazilian cities that will host the 2014
FIFA World Cup in 2014, and it will be the sole host of the Olympics.143 The erection of these walls is not popular with favela
residents; in Rocinha, 1,056 people voted against it, 50 voted for
it.144 Because these walls will be built along highways as well,
there is a similarity with what took place in Cape Town before the
2010 FIFA World Cup along highways proximate to townships.
The formal policy is addressed to the issue of favela growth, but
the most telling aspect of the program is that it is taking place in
favelas that are proximate to the city, close to wealthier neighborhoods, and generally in Zona Sul. These are not the favelas that
might be said to see rapid growth rates, pushing homes into
neighboring forest, open, or natural areas. These walls also block
the natural environment from view for those within the favela.

IV. LOOKING

AT

LOS ANGELES

THROUGH THE

LENS

OF

RIO

Like Rio de Janeiro, Los Angeles was born a global city.145
According to one analyst, “Americans did not introduce California
to the world. When they arrived, they found the world already
there.”146 In a formal respect, Los Angeles was founded as a consequence of Spanish imperial extension in the 1700s after many
decades of exploration through the state. While members of the
Spanish empire, the city’s founders were born in Mexico, a mix of
African, indigenous, and European ethnicities.147 They were the
first Californios and the first Los Angelinos. While still a pueblo,
Los Angeles traded with the world: 40% with Mexico and Latin
America; 35% with France, Russia, and Hawaii; and, 25% with the
eastern United States.148
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo guaranteed Californios citizenship and “enjoyment of liberty and property.”149 At the same
time, Texas Rangers arrived in Los Angeles following the war and
carried out vigilante justice for Mexicans that included lynch142.
143.
144.
145.

PERLMAN, supra note 24, at 28.
Id.
Turcheti e Melo, supra note 78, at 23.
Louis Pubols, Born Global: From Pueblo to Statehood, in A COMPANION TO LOS
ANGELES 20-39, 20 (William Deverell & Greg Hise eds., Wiley Blackwell 2010).
146. Id. at 33.
147. Id. at 24.
148. Id. at 33.
149. RICHARD WHITE, “IT’S YOUR MISFORTUNE AND NONE OF MY OWN:” A HISTORY OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 237 (1st ed. 1991).
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ing.150 As a consequence of a complicated legal process instituted
following the institution of California as a state, Californios had to
defend or establish their legal right to property. In most cases,
Californios lost their land due to the high cost of legal defense and
property taxes.151 This system was widespread throughout the
American Southwest.152 According to Richard White, even if the
formal legal process secured his land, “a ranchero often found his
herds and orchards destroyed and himself deeply in debt for the
cost of defending his land.”153 A devastating drought was the final
straw for most Los Angeles rancheros.154 They were quickly
replaced by American east coast and midwesterners as economic
and political leaders, eager to make the formal link with the
United States more elaborate in respect to identity, the economy,
and political development. Pio Pico, governor of California in the
1840s, was prescient when he said that the consequence of “Yankee” migration to the territory would result in the populations
becoming “strangers in [their] own land.”155
As the foundational vision of the city was established, the
early Mexican presence was romanticized as Spanish, while the
local population of Mexicans and Chicanos was disparaged. Drawing on this image of a city that was culturally and ecologically
Mediterranean, city promoters promised “an easier, more varied,
less complicated, and well rewarded life.”156 Los Angeles worked
hard to attract Midwestern migrants, in the same way that Rio
worked hard to lure the Portuguese and other European populations to settle. Downtown business exclusively hired men who
looked Nordic and whose lineage was Anglo-Saxon.157 In 1924, the
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce stated, “for centuries the
Anglo-Saxon race has been marching Westward . . . the apex of its
movement is Los Angeles County.”158 In 1929, a former member of
150. Eric Avila, Social Flashpoints, in A COMPANION TO LOS ANGELES 95, 98
(William Deverell & Greg Hise eds., Wiley-Blackwell 2010).
151. JOHN D. WEAVER, EL PUEBLO GRANDE, A NON-FICTION BOOK ABOUT LOS
ANGELES 20 (Ward Ritchie Press 1973).
152. EVELYN NAKANO GLENN, UNEQUAL FREEDOM: HOW RACE AND GENDER SHAPED
AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP AND LABOR 147 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
153. WHITE, supra note 149, at 238.
154. Id.
155. WEAVER, supra note 151, at 20.
156. ROBERT M. FOGELSON, THE FRAGMENTED METROPOLIS: LOS ANGELES, 18501930 72 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1993) (1967).
157. Mike Davis, Sunshine and the Open Shop: Ford and Darwin in 1920s Los
Angeles, in Metropolis in the Making: Los Angeles in the 1920s 96, 116 (Tom Sitton &
William Deverell eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2001).
158. Clark Davis, The View from Spring Street: White-Collar Men in the City of
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the Ku Klux Klan was elected mayor of Los Angeles.159 However,
by 1930, twenty percent of all Los Angelinos were Mexican or
Mexican-American. This was not featured in any of city’s public
relations efforts, but market demands for manual and domestic
labor, similar to those in Rio, pressed local businesses to support
and recruit non-white workers.160 When the Mexican Revolution
slowed migration, agents for the railroads went directly into central Mexico to find laborers, paying interested men the cost of
their transport to the border.
In the 1920s, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce fought
to retain legislation and regulation that supported the import of
Mexican workers. Appealing to ideas about local race hierarchy,
the Chamber maintained in one civic setting that “much of California’s agricultural labor requirements consist of those tasks to
which the oriental and Mexican due to their crouching and bending habits are fully adapted.”161 The building of the interurban
lines in Los Angeles along with other pieces of local economic
infrastructure created thousands of jobs for Mexicans and Chicanos.162 On this basis, the city expanded economically, became the
most important western port, and grew to the most dynamic western state economy, overtaking San Francisco in the 1930s. In the
1930s and 1940s, as city reformers made demands for greater
inclusion, class was addressed, and race was not. As issues of
equity were taken up by the city, there were only very limited
efforts to include the interests of non-white populations.163
To simultaneously maintain the urban vision and accommodate the economy’s need for cheap labor, Los Angeles pursued a
policy of racial segregation.164 This policy included urban petty
apartheid, which embraced many public facilities like pools, playgrounds, and beaches, but until the early 1930s, it also included
Angels, in Metropolis in the Making: Los Angeles in the 1920s 179, 183 (Tom Sitton &
William Deverell eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2001) (quoting Clarence Matson, The Los
Angeles of Tomorrow, 3 S. CAL. BUS., 37 (1924)).
159. Tom Sitton, Did the Ruling Class Rule at City Hall in 1920s Los Angeles?, in
Metropolis in the Making: Los Angeles in the 1920s 302, 314 (Tom Sitton & William
Deverell eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2001)
160. RICARDO ROMO, EAST LOS ANGELES: HISTORY OF A BARRIO 11 (Univ. of Texas
1983).
161. DOUGLAS CAZAUX SACKMAN, ORANGE EMPIRE: CALIFORNIA AND THE FRUITS OF
EDEN 130 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
162. ROMO, supra note 160.
163. George J. Sanchez, Disposable People, Expendable Neighborhoods, in A
COMPANION TO LOS ANGELES 129, 131 (William Deverell & Greg Hise eds., 2010).
164. FOGELSON, supra note 156, at 200.
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civil service job lists and schools.165 Retailers, restaurants, hotels,
and theaters continued racial discrimination, at times by simply
denying entry. Large business and manufacturing enterprises
separated workforce facilities. However, the most extensive form
of race segregation was done through the marginalization and
manipulation of neighborhood development. At the beginning of
the twentieth century, a nationally pioneering city zoning ordinance was written to protect the westside of Los Angeles from all
industrial development.166 Restrictive covenants were adopted in
Los Angeles to create neighborhoods that were legally segregated
by race. The first appeared in reference to the western and southern areas of the city in 1917.167 These ordinances were consistently
upheld by California courts. Then in 1948, the Supreme Court outlawed these covenants as a consequence of a court case brought by
an African-American couple who had been imprisoned for violating the local covenant.168 While overt segregation was thus outlawed, there were social and economic pressures which
maintained it in coming decades in East Los Angeles as well as
African-American areas of the city.169 The FHA refused mortgage
guarantees in neighborhoods near industry, and the more informal networks of real estate agents and local banking continued to
maintain that segregation for many decades following. It is not
until the Open Housing Act of 1968 that these practices were
discontinued.170
Boyle Heights was the first eastside neighborhood, settled in
the late nineteenth century, to include Mexican immigrants.171 It
included other non-Anglo-Saxon groups as well—Jews, Italians,
Russians, Japanese, Poles, and the Irish—and initially it was an
attractive residential option for the middle as well as working
class.172 With the establishment of racial zoning prior to the First
World War, Boyle Heights became the earliest section of what
would become East Los Angeles.173 Progressives, bohemians and
165. Id. at 201.
166. Spalding, The Myth of the Classic Slum: Contradictory Perceptions of Boyle
Heights Flats, 1900-1991, 45 J. ARCHITECTURAL EDUC. 107, 107 (1992).
167. Roger Waldinger & Mehdi Bozorgmehr, The Making of a Multicultural
Metropolis, in ETHNIC LOS ANGELES 45 (Roger Waldinger & Mehdi Bozorgmehr eds.,
1996).
168. Id. at 56.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 52.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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radicals added leftist politics to the ethnic diversity of the neighborhood in the 1920s, but the poorer, Mexican parts of the area
were defining for city officials.174 Early in the 1900s, these parts of
Boyle Heights were defined as a slum.175 As in the case of Rio de
Janerio, the city first identified the neighborhood as a problem
with the arrival of disease, in this case, bubonic plague.176 One
area of multiple dwellings, housing predominantly single, male
immigrant workers, was judged by the Los Angeles Housing Commission at the time to be “overcrowded and unsanitary, lacking
sufficient water supply, toilet facilities, and drainage.”177 New city
ordinances were passed to address this, but some housing that
was so distinctively informal was destroyed.178 During the Depression, impoverished, informal neighborhoods were identified with
family breakdown, delinquency, and crime.179 Given the use of
threats and government harassment at the time to force Mexicans
to leave the area and the country, this public agency perception is
almost humorous. Nonetheless city reformers worked with such
stereotypes to affect change in popular support for public housing.
What was repressed was that the flats of Boyle Heights had
vibrant culture with a “surprising harmonious ecology of
ethnicities.”
In 1941, Ramona Gardens was the first public housing to
open as a consequence of reformist government activism. This was
progressive politics of the day. It was built on thirty-two acres of
land cleared as a consequence of successful repatriation policies
carried out during the depression.180 The creation of Aliso Village
in 1946 required the bulldozing of the homes of established
residents. To lay the groundwork for this in some areas of Boyle
Heights, there was a block to block appraisal in order to determine
which areas would be razed. Since the city was also planning for
the building of new highways through the same neighborhood,
this was a period of considerable upheaval. Boyle Heights,
between 1940-42, received half, five out of ten, of all new public
housing projects. Some residents had already sold their homes,
but those who remained would be forced to sell for a much-dimin174. ROBERT GOTTLIEB, ET AL., THE NEXT LOS ANGELES: THE STRUGGLE
LIVABLE CITY 17 (Univ. of Cal. Press 2005).
175. Spalding, supra note 166, at 107.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 108.
178. Id. at 107.
179. Id. at 112.
180. Sanchez, supra note 163, at 137.

FOR A
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ished price or take what the city was able to offer.181 In theory, the
new public housing to be constructed was for neighborhood people.
In fact, done under the egis of urban redevelopment, public housing was made available to defense workers and veterans as well
those who were a part of the in-migration from the dust bowl,
Okies.182
Chavez Ravine was also identified as a neighborhood which
would be improved with the building of public housing, but it was
a case where the planners were forced to acknowledge that “the
Ravine was ‘charming,’ that its people seemed happy and welladjusted and had a rather intense feeling of pride in, and identity
with their community.”183 As in the case of many favelas, the positive nature of culture and community were evident to external
analysts. No one at the time thought that seriously about alternatives to slum clearance, such as improving the infrastructure or
giving residents the resources to improve their homes. By the
1950s there was a community-based, political battle over the city’s
plans for redevelopment for both Chavez Ravine and Bunker Hill.
The plan for Chavez Ravine included business plazas and office
buildings as well as the building of Dodger Stadium.184 The planning for the Stadium was done in order to entice the Brooklyn
team to Los Angeles. Bunker Hill housing was razed in order to
build the LA Music Center.
As this story of LA public housing indicates, after the Second
World War, Los Angeles defined an approach to the removal of
population and the redefinition of East Los Angeles through the
building of large public infrastructure: public housing, freeways,
and sports stadiums. George Sanchez argues that the consequence
of these policies amounted to “ethnic cleansing of local geographies to solidify the claims of white Los Angeles residents to the
benefits of citizenship.”185 The introduction of a massive freeway
presence in East Los Angeles began when the city was forced to
acknowledge that traffic coming downtown from the eastside was
creating congestion. In the 1920s, improvements were first made
in the scale and accessibility of Whittier Boulevard. Multiple economic interests were considered, but “the working-class eastsiders
who use the park, playground and schoolyards were not heard in
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id. at 136.
Spalding, supra note 166, at 115.
Id. at 118.
Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, supra note 167, at 58.
Sanchez, supra note 163, at 130.
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the deliberations nor were they asked whether an improved highway was worth the sacrifice of their recreational areas.”186 It
marked the neighborhood, very early in the history of the new
American Los Angeles, as a place where the city was willing to
sacrifice residential quality of life to support commerce and the
local economy.
This paved the way, both literally and figuratively, for the elevated highway construction in the 1940s just north of Whittier
Boulevard that became the Santa Ana Freeway.187 The elevation
meant that now travelers could drive through East Los Angeles
and not see it.188 The contract between the State and the City identified an area in Boyle Heights, which would a decade later
become a massive freeway interchange. But confronting the fact
that two freeways were to cross in the midst of this Chicano community was delayed.189 One analyst calls this “a social ellipsis, a
deliberate tactic to avoid calling attention to its effects.”190 Others
have pointed out how freeways in Los Angeles disproportionately
impacted non-white neighborhoods.191 In the late 1950s,
thousands of residents from Boyle Heights, Lincoln Heights, City
Terrace, and surrounding East LA neighborhoods were forced to
leave so that freeways might be built.192 By 1960, four different
freeways had been built through the neighborhood, taking up fifteen percent of neighborhood geography.193 This was a record for
Los Angeles and made East LA the hub of the LA freeway system.
The Mexican-American community was reorganized “without consideration for residents’ loyalties to churches, schools, businesses,
or family.”194 The Boyle Heights flats by the early nineties was “a
neglected urban island, cut off from the north, south, and east by
freeways and to the west by railway tracks and the Los Angeles
River flood channel.”195 The public housing built to replace slum
conditions was considered troubled and had not been given continued public support.196 The policy of building necessary city infra186. Matthew W. Roth, Whittier Boulevard, Sixth Street Bridge, and the Origins of
Transportation Exploitation in East Los Angeles, 30 J. URB. HIST. 729, 740 (2004).
187. Id. at 742.
188. Id. at 744.
189. Id. at 742-43.
190. Roth, supra note 186, at 743.
191. Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, supra note 167, at 58.
192. ROMO, supra note 160, at 170.
193. Sanchez, supra note 163, at 136.
194. ROMO, supra note 160, at 170.
195. Spalding, supra note 166, at 117.
196. Id. at 118.
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structure concentrated in one poor, non-white neighborhood is an
indirect, even hidden, democratically sanctioned, forced
removal.197
During the Depression, an official strategy of forcing Mexicans and Chicanos out of their neighborhoods was embedded in
the efforts to repatriate as many people as possible back to Mexico. The Depression was already in full swing with ten percent of
Los Angelinos unemployed. In the midst of a job crisis, there was a
local campaign to make sure all new jobs went to Anglos.198 Mexicans on local relief rolls were challenged, and there was popular
support for a public policy approach according to which only citizens should receive relief. The impact of the economic downturn
was especially hard in poorer neighborhoods. The city was turning
off power and gas as bills that remained unpaid in many homes in
East LA.199 These more passive forms of removal were soon backed
with a call for formal repatriation. Boyle Heights was targeted.200
By 1930, 150,000 Mexicans had left Los Angeles voluntarily or
involuntarily.201 Some were either directly asked or organized by
government agents to leave; others were so frightened by what
they witnessed that they left on their own.202 According to Richard
White, “[m]any of the repatriated believed that if they did not
return to Mexico voluntarily, the federal government would expel
them.”203 Following this, as Los Angeles more vigorously industrialized in the 1930s and 1940s, it was native, white, working class
men who took the jobs that had originally been held by residents
of the Mexican-American neighborhoods.204
As the most vigorous effort to repatriate Mexicans was developed and initiated by country officials and some businessmen, the
Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce again asked political officials
to secure “calm in the Mexican community.”205 Los Angeles was
still both a farming and an industrial city.206 There was agricul197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
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tural land interspersed with urban life, and the surrounding rural
areas were also highly dependent on labor from Mexico.207 So
while no one wanted to pay for relief for Mexicans or MexicanAmericans, and while there was a concerted effort to hire only
white, native workers in the city, there was continued interest in
Mexican labor in agriculture. According to McWilliams, some agricultural workers were repatriated several times, after being
recruited more than once to come back to work in the Californian
fields.208 This kind of flip-flop pattern of immigration and repatriation continued throughout the early thirties, but as the decade
ended, white agricultural workers had replaced their Mexican
counterparts, and in many cases they were urban refugees who
had been dropped from LA’s relief rolls and forced to work in the
fields or face prosecution.209 While the immediate, inconsistent
labor policy was ended in the mid-1930s, by the beginning of the
1940s, a new program of Mexican labor recruitment began with
the initiation of the Bracero Program.210 A hypocritical schizophrenia seemed embedded in the American public policy psyche on the
issue of Mexican workers and the economy. This might be epitomized by the leadership of someone like Herbert Hoover, who during the Depression identified Mexicans as the cause of economic
difficulties, while during the First World War, he worked to
recruit them in larger numbers in order to maintain wartime
production.211
During World War II, there were rightist groups in the city,
which carried out racist fear campaigns.212 It was not uncommon
for the press to echo such perspective, with the local Hearts press
attacking “Los Angeles Mexican American residents as ‘greasers,’
‘puchucos,’ and ‘zoot suiters,’ using blatant racist stereotypes.”213
In January of 1943, following a murder investigation and trial,
seventeen Mexican-American young men were convicted of a
range of violent crime, from assault to first degree murder.214 The
prosecution in the presentation of its case characterized the
207. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 128.
208. Id. at 129.
209. Id. at 287-88.
210. Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, supra note 167, at 3, 10.
211. WHITE, supra note 149, at 470-72.
212. ROBERT GOTTLIEB ET AL., supra note 174, at 25.
213. Id.
214. Scott Kurashige, Between “White Spot” and “World City”: Racial Integration
and the Roots of Multiculturalism, in A COMPANION TO LOS ANGELES 56, 63 (William
Deverell and Greg Hise eds., 2010).
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defendants as men of “savage racial essence.”215 The LAPD’s
report to the Grand Jury had itself referred to Mexicans as “inherently criminal and biologically prone to violence.”216 The evidence
against the defendants was weak enough that the decision to convict was eventually overturned by a court of appeals. But five
months following the trial, there was spontaneous, massive mob
violence against the Mexican-American community.217 It was led
by off-duty military men, who initially targeted Mexican-American zoot-suiters, who were seen as draft dodgers.218 The attacks
soon included civilians on both sides.219 It started downtown, but
angry groups went into East Los Angeles and beat up people on
the street.220 Civil and military authorities looked the other way.221
At Mexican insistence, the State Department became involved to
end the violence “since it appeared that Los Angeles officials
would not.”222
In 1970, there were only 211,500 Mexicans in a city population of 7 million. By the end of the nineties, “the immigration of
the last twenty-five years has reconnected contemporary Los
Angeles with its origins.”223 In the twenty-first century, East Los
Angeles, which was home to some of this population flow, along
with the South Central neighborhood, was still one of the poorest
neighborhoods in Los Angeles. In LA County, 40% of the population could trace familial origins to Mexico, and the region as a
whole contained the largest urban popular outside of Mexico City.

V. NORTH MIRRORS SOUTH, SOUTH MIRRORS NORTH
Both Rio de Janeiro and Los Angeles are cities of global reach,
and they have been for many decades, even centuries. The urban
vision of each has been shaped fundamentally by the fact that
both were part of settler societies and states. They are both the
consequence of early exploration in Africa and the Americas in the
16th and 17th centuries by Spain and Portugal.224 Rio de Janeiro’s
215. Id.
216. GEORGE J. SANCHEZ, BECOMING MEXICAN AMERICAN: ETHNICITY, CULTURE, AND
IDENTITY IN CHICANO LOS ANGELES, 1900-1945 266 (Oxford Univ. Press 1993).
217. Kurashige, supra note 214, at 63.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. ROMO, supra note 160, at 167.
221. WEAVER, supra note 151, at 104-05.
222. ROMO, supra note 160, at 167.
223. Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, supra note 167, at 247.
224. Waldinger & Bozorgmehr, supra note 167, at 3-4.
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origins are also rooted in the Atlantic slave trade, and that of Los
Angeles in the U.S. acquisition of Mexican territories.225 These
were cities of racial hierarchy in which new settler populations
acquired land as a result of conquest, articulating an urban vision
that excluded the conquered.226 In a historical era of unapologetic
empire, perhaps this is unsurprising, but it nevertheless set a
foundation for a vision that was highly exclusive in its political
spirit. In these cities, race was a widely accepted social marker of
the dangerousness of class.
The overlap of race and class, and the diversity within that
overlap, leads some in Brazil to see the idea of race as very different than that in the United States. American analysts see the
attempt, for example, to romanticize the racial mixture in Brazil
as dishonest. For example, in a contemporary respect, women who
are white or mixed race can be considered beautiful, but those
with predominantly African bodies and features will not be.227
While to a certain degree this discussion has taken identity as a
given, some students of urban society and politics maintain that
the construction of neighborhood racial identity through the legislation on housing and finance are the institutional avenues which
create and/or maintain important political distinctions in racial
identity.228 The preceding section argued that, while there are differences in ideological justification and in institutional implementation between Rio and LA, in respect to categorizing peoples and
neighborhoods in a way which integrated race and class, there are
great similarities. Further, the discussion of Los Angeles suggests
that despite democratic ideology, the social contours of democratic
politics in such a social context can act like authoritarian polities
and create one class of people with rights and another without. In
this context we learn that democracy can be as, or nearly as,
repressive, intolerant, and discriminatory as authoritarian systems in respect to the freedom to choose ones neighborhood and
ones residence and thus to own property, claim community, and to
hold full urban citizenship.229
The question arises as to what defines an illegal citizen—and
thus what defines a legal citizen. The vast majority of residents of
Rio’s favelas live in homes which they improve and maintain, but
225. MCWILLIAMS, supra note 202, at 12-13.
226. Id.
227. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 122, at 120-22.
228. Clarissa Rile Hayward, The Difference States Make: Democracy, Identity, and
the American City, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 501, 506 (2003).
229. ROMO, supra note 160, at 4.
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to which they have no legal right.230 Increasingly, they have
acquired other rights which were still denied to them deep into the
twentieth century: right to vote, right to work, right to social
security, right to sue in a court of law, and the like. The legal status of many residents of East Los Angeles has also been in flux for
much of this neighborhood’s history and remains so today. The
juxtaposition of the tenuous and legally unprotected state of
favela residents and Mexican-Americans in many part of contemporary Los Angeles makes clear that the economies of both cities
on premised on a requirement that those who perform necessary
manual or menial labor, for which the economy has considerable
demand, be constricted in their access to democratic freedoms.231
The city governments of both Los Angeles and Rio de Janeiro
have from time to time over the last century made life miserable
and insecure for the working class populations in marginal neighborhoods who drive trucks, clean houses, build roads, harvest
crops, establish small scale businesses, wait tables, and the like.
Even when such neighborhoods have established meaningful community and vibrant culture, the city intervenes to forcibly remove
them into alienating and alienated residential configurations. In
all respects, it is the rise of social movements that have challenged
this pattern, called for access to political rights and resources, and
blocked city projects that would have continued previous patterns.232 Los Angeles was never a union friendly town, but the earliest Chicano civil rights movement grew out of 1930s labor
organizing, sometimes in cooperation with other racial groups, for
better wages and improved working conditions.233 This grew to a
broader set of political demands emanating from East Los Angeles, where an early leader was elected to the city council.234 Similarly in Rio, the social movement politics of the late seventies and
early eighties integrated favelas into modern democratic politics
in Brazil. Current groups like AfroReggae, which create cultural
community centers in the midst of internal war, and which claim
favela space in a variety of ways, also mediates the most serious
conflicts between drug gangs in favelas where they work.235
There have been also been serious political attempts to
230.
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address directly the issue of illegal occupation or residence.236
There are experiments in Rio with the extension of legal, urban,
land tenure, which legitimate the presence of favelas and their
residents.237 In respect to East Los Angeles, there have been
national efforts to offer reform and address the lack of legal citizenship status, which vexes many in LA.238 But in the main, the
specter of illegal land ownership or illegal political rights continues to create a huge contradiction between the needs of the market, which demands the presence of a working class of very low
wages, and those of the local and/or national polis which continues
to exclude them. In studying political and economic change in the
developing world, academics in industrialized countries rarely
compare developed to developing countries, North to South.
Michel Foucault playfully, yet seriously, challenges social
scientists to consider the categories they create to order the world
in his discussion of Borges on an early Chinese encyclopedia.239
The encyclopedia, in establishing distinctions among types of animals, includes categories like innumerable, fabulous, and having
just broken the water pitcher.240 When we first read through this,
it seems very fanciful, even associative.241 Foucault is proposing
that how we order the world embraces different types or levels of
order, and suggests that we be attentive to that which permeates
both cultural-normative and scientific assumptions.242 The persistence of threat of forced removal to populations in very different
city, cultural, and political contexts but which are nevertheless
always populations very necessary to the local economy, seems to
be a part of what Foucault calls “the pure experience of order.”243
Though it may be that it is more simply a part of the Chinese
encyclopedia as presented by Borges.244 Perhaps in respect to both
Rio and LA, these populations ‘belong to the Emperor.’245
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